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Mommy Dearest: 
Determining Parental Rights 
and Enforceability of Surrogacy 
Agreements 
 
Honorable William J. Giacomo with Angela DiBiasi, Esq. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Advances in reproduction technology raise difficult legal 
questions concerning the enforceability of surrogacy parenting 
agreements.  By way of example, consider the recent divorce 
and custody battle involving television talk show host and 
comedian Sherri Shepherd.  She and her then-husband entered 
into a surrogacy agreement whereby a donor egg was fertilized 
in vitro1 with the sperm of Shepherd’s husband, and later 
implanted in a surrogate to carry the child.2  By this surrogacy 
 
* Honorable William J. Giacomo (B.S. Boston College, J.D. Pace University 
School of Law) is a Justice of the Supreme Court, 9th Judicial District and an 
Adjunct Professor at Pace University.  Angela DiBiasi, Esq. is a Principal 
Court Attorney for the Supreme Court, 9th Judicial District. 
 
* An earlier version of this article was originally published in the 
July/August 2015 issue of the New York State Bar Association Journal. 
1. See In vitro fertilization, WIKIPEDIA, 
 
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_vitro_fertilisation (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). 
 
In vitro fertilization . . . (IVF) is a process by which an egg is 
fertilized by sperm outside the body in vitro (‘in glass’) . . . .  
The fertilized egg (zygote) is cultured for 2-6 days in a 
growth medium and is then implanted in the same or 
another woman’s uterus, with the intention of establishing a 
successful pregnancy. 
Id. 
2. See generally Hollie McKay, Can Sherri Shepherd Walk Away from 
Unborn Surrogate Child?, FOX NEWS (July 22, 2014), 
http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2014/07/22/can-sherri-shepherd-
walk-away-from-unborn-surrogate-child/. 
1
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arrangement, the egg donor and Sherri Shepherd’s husband 
are the biological parents with a genetic tie to the resulting 
child. After conception, Sherri Shepherd and her husband filed 
for divorce. Shepherd is the financial “breadwinner” of the 
marriage who does not want custody, parenting rights or child 
support obligations based on the fact that she did not give birth 
and has no genetic connection to the resulting child.  These 
legal proceedings are further complicated by the fact that 
Sherri Shepherd filed for divorce in New Jersey (which has a 
similar stance to New York in deeming surrogacy agreements 
as unenforceable), while her husband filed for divorce in 
California (which recognizes the enforceability of surrogacy 
agreements).3  The laws governing surrogacy agreements in the 
aforementioned states yield contrary results on the issue.  The 
governing law in this area is new and evolving and, as such, 
the allocation of the legal rights and responsibilities depend on 
which state has jurisdiction over the matter.  This article will 
discuss the basic types of surrogacy agreements and examine 
the legal distinctions of their enforceability under New York 
and California law. 
 
II.  Background on Surrogacy Agreements 
 
There are two forms of surrogacy: gestational and 
traditional.  “In a gestational surrogacy, the surrogate mother 
is not genetically related to the child.  Eggs are extracted from 
the intended mother or egg donor and mixed with sperm from 
the intended father or sperm donor in vitro.”4  Sherri Shepherd 
and her then-husband entered into a form of gestational 
surrogacy agreement.  As such, neither Sherri Shepherd nor 
the surrogate have a genetic tie to the resulting child.  In 
contrast, under a traditional surrogacy agreement, “the 
surrogate mother is artificially inseminated with the sperm of 
 
3. See generally Andrea Peyser, Unborn Child Faces Uncertain Fate in 
Sherri Shepherd’s Divorce War, N.Y. POST (July 14, 2014, 2:31 AM), 
http://nypost.com/2014/07/14/unborn-child-faces-uncertain-fate-in-sherri-
shepherds-divorce-war/. 
4. See Jenn Z., Definitions and Types of Surrogacy, SURROGATE MOTHERS 
ONLINE, http://www.surromomsonline.com/articles/define.htm (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2015). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/7
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the intended father or sperm donor.  The surrogate’s own egg 
will be used, thus she will be the genetic mother of the 
resulting child.”5 
A written surrogacy agreement is usually executed by the 
parties seeking a surrogate and the surrogate who will carry 
the resulting child.  The terms of the agreement include the 
surrogate mother’s obligation to carry the child in exchange for 
certain compensation paid to the surrogate.  A traditional 
surrogacy agreement, where the surrogate mother provides her 
egg and is the biological mother of the resulting child, includes 
a waiver whereby the surrogate agrees to terminate her 
parental rights.  The parties to a surrogacy agreement also 
agree to specific terms regarding medical care, finances, travel 
expenses, and the like to be paid by the parties seeking the 
surrogate.6 
 
III.  Comparative Analysis of Enforceability of Surrogacy 
Agreement 
 
A.  New York Law 
 
The issue of surrogate parenting contracts has been a 
controversial one in New York and action to address the issue 
was commenced by the New York State Legislature in 1992 in 
the wake of Matter of Baby M,7 after several lower courts in 
New York reached somewhat conflicting determinations.8  The 
Legislature enacted Domestic Relations Law § 122 effective 
July 1993 to address the issue.  The Matter of Baby M case 
filed in New Jersey involved a traditional surrogacy parenting 
agreement where 
 
5. Id. 
6. See generally Free Online Legal Forms from All Law – Family 
Documents – Surrogate Parenting Agreement, ALLLAW, www.alllaw.com/ 
forms/family/surrogate_parenting (last visited Aug. 26, 2015) (examples of 
traditional surrogacy agreements); see generally Sample Traditional 
Surrogacy Contract, SURROGATE MOTHERS ONLINE, 
www.surromomsonline.com/articles/ts_contract.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 
2015). 
7. See In re Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
8. 45 N.Y. JUR. 2D DOM. REL. § 330. 
3
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a married woman had been inseminated with . . . 
a ‘purchasing’ father’s sperm who agreed to pay 
the woman a $10,000 fee.  After the birth of the 
child, the woman refused to give up the child.  
While the trial court decreed enforcement of the 
surrogacy contract, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that the contract was unenforceable 
as against public policy.9 
 
New York subsequently codified Domestic Relations Law § 
122, stating that “[s]urrogate parenting contracts are hereby 
declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void 
and unenforceable.”10  Domestic Relations Law § 121(4) defines 
a “surrogacy parenting agreement” as an agreement in which 
“(a) a woman agrees either to be inseminated with the sperm of 
a man who is not her husband or to be impregnated with an 
embryo that is the product of an ovum fertilized with the sperm 
of a man who is not her husband; and (b) the woman agrees to, 
or intends to, surrender or consent to the adoption of the child 
born as a result of such insemination or impregnation.”11  
Interestingly, the legislature did not state that such agreement 
was entered into in exchange for any monetary compensation.  
Furthermore, Domestic Relations Law §124 provides that “the 
court shall not consider the birth mother’s participation in a 
surrogate parenting contract as adverse to her parental rights, 
status, or obligations”12 when determining parental issues 
relating to the resulting child.  In other words, the fact that the 
surrogate mother bore a child pursuant to a surrogacy 
agreement cannot be used against her in a court of law if she 
seeks custody or parenting rights to the resulting child. 
Referring back to Sherri Shepherd’s surrogacy scenario, 
New York law (which is similar to New Jersey law) favors 
Shepherd since New York deems surrogacy agreements void 
and against public policy.  Shepherd, as the financial 
 
9. Alan D. Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 
122 (McKinney 2015). 
10. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2015). 
11. Id. § 121(4). 
12. Id. § 124(1). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/7
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‘breadwinner’ spouse, could be successful in avoiding child 
support or parental obligations pertaining to the child resulting 
from an unenforceable surrogacy agreement.  Her ex-husband 
and the egg donor, as the child’s biological parents, could 
potentially be subject to statutory child support and parental 
obligations. 
 
 Two cases involving parental rights of a stepparent and a 
spouse in a same-sex couple raise related issues worth noting.  
In Monroe Dept. of Social Services ex. rel. Palermo v. Palermo,13 
the Monroe Department of Social Services appealed a Family 
Court Hearing Examiner’s determination that the 
respondent/stepfather had no support obligations for his 
stepchildren, although he was directed to maintain “family” 
medical insurance coverage for his stepchildren.  The court 
ultimately held that the respondent/stepfather was not 
obligated to pay child support for the stepchildren, absent 
showing that the county social services department was unable 
to recover support from the children’s biological fathers.  In 
this case, the biological fathers’ identities were known by the 
social services department, and the court noted that one 
stepchild was born of an extramarital relationship entered into 
by the mother years after she separated from the 
respondent/stepfather.14  While the stepparent scenario is 
distinguishable from the surrogacy scenario since the 
stepparent did not contractually arrange to bring the child into 
the world, it should be noted that in reviewing this stepparent 
situation the court similarly held that the biological parents 
have the primary responsibility for the child.15 
In the recent case of Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M,16 a same-sex 
marital couple entered into an agreement whereby one of the 
female spouses was inseminated with a donor’s sperm, 
resulting in the birth of a child.  The birth mother filed for 
divorce.  Her spouse (who is not biologically connected to the 
child) sought access to the resulting child.  Applying New York 
 
13. Monroe Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Palermo v. Palermo, 596 
N.Y.S.2d 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
14. Id. at 253 (internal citations omitted). 
15. Id.; see 46 N.Y. JUR.2D DOM. REL. § 901. 
16. Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M, 985 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 2014). 
5
  
2015 MOMMY DEAREST 255 
common law, the court held that she was presumed to be a 
parent of the child conceived from artificial insemination and 
born during the marriage of the same-sex couple, which 
marriage had occurred in another state before New York 
enacted its Marriage Equality Act.17  The court found that 
“New York’s public policy strongly favors the legitimacy of 
children, and the presumption that a child born to a marriage 
is the legitimate child of both parents is one of the strongest 
and persuasive known to law.”18  This case is distinguishable 
from a surrogacy scenario in that it dealt with issues 
pertaining to the legitimacy of children and, as such, 
recognized parentage beyond biological ties to the resulting 
child.  However, the court did not make a determination on the 
enforceability of the assisted reproduction agreement. 
 
B.  California Law 
 
Contrary to New York, California recognizes the 
enforceability of surrogacy contracts.  California’s favorable 
approach to surrogacy agreements is acknowledged in 
surrogacy parenting agreement standardized forms which 
contain a choice of law provision designating the applicability 
of California for dispute resolution.19  In fact, such forms 
oftentimes specifically reference the California Supreme 
Court’s decision in Johnson v. Calvert.20 
The Johnson v. Calvert case involves a gestational 
surrogacy agreement where the egg is extracted from the 
intended mother, sperm extracted from the intended father, 
implanted into the surrogate, and thus the surrogate has no 
biological connection to the child.21  After the birth, the 
“husband and wife brought suit seeking declaration that they 
were legal parents of child born of [a] woman in whom [the] 
 
17. Id. at 858. 
18. Id. at 848 (internal citations omitted). 
19. See generally Sample Traditional Surrogacy Contract, SURROGATE 
MOTHERS ONLINE, www.surromomsonline.com/articles/ts_contract.htm (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2015). 
20. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
21. Id.; see Jenn Z., Definitions and Types of Surrogacy, SURROGATE 
MOTHERS ONLINE, http://www.surromomsonline.com/articles/define.htm (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2015). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/7
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couple’s fertilized egg had been implanted.”22  The trial court 
held that husband and wife, as the biological and contractually 
intended parents, were the legal parents of the resulting child, 
and the surrogate had no parental rights to the child.23  The 
surrogate appealed the trial court’s determination, which was 
upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District and the 
Supreme Court of California.24  The Supreme Court of 
California’s decision examined the Uniform Parentage Act (the 
“Act”), which was repealed in 1994 and replaced with 
equivalent provisions in the Family Code.25  Under California 
Family Code, a woman may establish maternity by proof of 
genetics, child birth, or adoption.26  In applying this standard, 
both the wife (as the egg donor) and the surrogate (as the child-
bearer) had legitimate maternity claims via genetics and child 
birth respectively.  The court broke this “tie” in favor of the 
wife (as egg donor) who, prior to conception, was the intended 
mother to raise and care for the child.27  In its ruling, the court 
stated that surrogacy agreements are not inconsistent per se 
with public policy, and recognized that the gestational 
surrogacy agreement was a factor to be considered by courts 
when determining parental rights under the circumstances 
presented.28  The Johnson v. Calvert case “illustrates that 
gestational surrogacy poses fewer legal risks because the 
surrogate has no genetic tie to the child and consequently is 
less likely to be granted custody if she revokes her consent.”29 
It is important to recognize a key distinction between the 
gestational surrogacy which was the subject of the Johnson v. 
Calvert case versus Shepherd’s gestational surrogacy 
 
22. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 776. 
23. Id. at 778. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 779 n.5 (“[e]ffective January 1, 1994, [California] Civil Code 
sections 7000-7021 have been repealed and replaced with equivalent 
provisions in the Family Code.”) (citing 1992 CAL. STAT. ch. 162, § 4); see CAL. 
FAM. CODE §§ 7600-50 (West 1994)(effective Jan. 1, 1994). 
26. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782; see CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7610[a], 7601[c], 
7555 (West 2015). 
27. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782. 
28. Id. at 787. 
29. Abigail Lauren Perdue, For Love or Money: An Analysis of the 
Contractual Regulation of Reproductive Surrogacy, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y 279, 284-85 (2011). 
7
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arrangement.  The Johnson v. Calvert case involved a 
gestational surrogacy agreement where the egg is extracted 
from the intended mother, and thus the surrogate has no 
biological connection to the child.30  Under such circumstances, 
the court held that the legitimate maternity claims of Mrs. 
Calvert as the genetic mother and intended mother under the 
terms of the surrogacy parenting agreement prevailed.  In 
contrast, Sherri Shepherd’s gestational surrogacy arrangement 
involved an egg donor who is the genetic mother, and a 
surrogate who carried and delivered the child.  This gestational 
surrogacy scenario raises unique issues of parental rights 
between the egg donor with a genetic tie to the child, the 
intended mother who initiated the procedure which resulted in 
the child, and the surrogate who carried and delivered the 
child. 
In re Marriage of Moschetta31 was a case of first impression 
for the California Court of Appeals to determine parental 
rights of a child born of a traditional surrogacy agreement after 
the intended parents had separated.  Pursuant to the parties’ 
traditional surrogacy agreement, the wife/intended parent had 
no genetic tie to the child since the surrogate provided the egg 
fertilized by the husband’s sperm and carried the child to term.  
After the Moschettas took the child home, Mrs. Moschetta filed 
for legal separation and sought a determination that she was 
the ‘de facto mother’ entitled to custody of the child.  The 
surrogate joined in the proceeding also asserting parental 
rights to the child.32  “At [the 1992] trial no party asked the 
court to enforce the surrogacy contract; all agreed it was 
unenforceable. At the time they did not have the benefit of 
Johnson v. Calvert, which held that gestational surrogacy 
contracts do not, on their face, offend public policy.”33  The trial 
court deemed the surrogate the child’s legal mother.  In the 
wake of Johnson v. Calvert, Mr. Moschetta appealed that 
determination.  The appellate court upheld the trial court’s 
 
30. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.; see Jenn Z., Definition and Types of 
Surrogacy, SURROGATE MOTHERS ONLINE, http://www.surromomsonline.com/ 
articles/define.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2015). 
31. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (1994). 
32. Id. at 895. 
33. Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/7
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determination that the biological surrogate mother was the 
legal mother of the child, thus leaving the intended mother 
Mrs. Moschetta without parental rights.34  The court 
distinguished this case from Johnson v. Calvert since this case 
did not have the conflicting legitimate maternity claims based 
upon the Act’s standard factors; rather, the Moschettas’ 
surrogate was both the genetic mother and birth mother of the 
resulting child and she did not consent to an adoption of the 
child by the intended mother.  Accordingly, the appellate court 
held that it would be inappropriate to consider the validity of 
the surrogacy agreement where the Act resolved the parentage 
issue as the surrogate was both the genetic and birth mother of 
the child.35 
In 1998, the California appellate court reexamined related 
issues in Buzzanca v. Buzzanca.36  The Buzzanca couple had an 
embryo genetically unrelated to them arranged for in vitro 
fertilization into a surrogate to carry to term.  Prior to birth, 
Mr. Buzzanca filed for divorce and sought no responsibility to 
the child upon birth.  The trial court held that the child had no 
legal parents since the child had no connection by birth or 
genetics.37  The appellate court overturned the trial court and 
held that the Buzzanca couple were the legal parents, finding 
that genetic connection was not determinative. Rather, the 
court found that the parties’ intentions rendered the Buzzancas 
the legal parents, thus Mr. Buzzanca was responsible to the 
child upon birth.  The appellate court stated that the 
Buzzancas initiated and consented to the procedure which 
resulted in the birth of a child and, as such, are estopped from 
denying their parental obligation to the child.38 
 
34. Id. at 902-03; see Cynthia E. Fruchtman, Whose Pregnancy Is It?, 
CAL. LAW. (Jan. 2013), https://ww2.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?pubdt=NaN& 
eid=926465&evid=1. 
35. In re Moschetta, 830 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900-01; see RICHARD A. LORD, 7 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 16:22 (4th ed. 2010). 
36. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 283 (1998). 
37. Id. at 282. 
38. Elaine A. Lisko, California Appellate Court Holds Divorcing Spouses 
Who Were Intended Parents of Child Resulting from Anonymous Egg and 
Sperm Donors and Brought to Term by Surrogate to Be Legal Parents of 
Child, HEALTH L. & POL’Y INST. (Apr. 8, 1998), 
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/Reproductive/980408Child.ht
ml. 
9
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In applying the current applicable laws in the State of 
California, Sherri Shepherd could assert the position that her 
gestational surrogacy arrangement is distinguishable from the 
Johnson v. Calvert case since she is neither the genetic 
biological mother nor the child-bearing mother, and her only 
role was as a signatory to the surrogacy agreement.  Her ex-
husband could rely on the Buzzanca holding to assert that he 
and Sherri Shepherd were the intended parents under the 
surrogacy agreement and thus are the legal parents 
responsible for child support obligations, irrespective of the fact 
that the intended mother (Sherri Shepherd) has no biological 
connection to the child.39 
 
C.  Other States’ Laws Governing Surrogacy 
 
Each state has varying approaches to surrogacy contracts.  
Examples of states generally considered as favoring 
enforceability of surrogacy agreements include California, 
Illinois, Arkansas, Maryland, and New Hampshire.40  States 
that deem surrogacy contracts as void and against public policy 
include New York, Indiana, and Michigan.41  Some states, such 
as Utah, favor enforcing only gestational surrogacy contracts, 
while other states—such as Oklahoma—favor enforcing 
surrogacy contracts which do not require compensation.42  
Several states have not set forth any clear directives on the 
issue.43 
 
 
 
 
39. See In re Buzzanca, Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282; see also Artificial 
Insemination-Legal Aspects, CTR. FOR SURROGATE PARENTING, INC., 
 http://www.creatingfamilies.com/intended-parents/ 
default.aspx?id=100&type=. 
40. See Surrogacy Laws by Country, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Surrogacy_laws_by_country  (last visited Aug. 26, 2015). 
41. See Surrogacy Laws by State, ALL ABOUT SURROGACY (2013), 
 http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/surrogacylaws.htm; cf. Lisko, supra note 
38. 
42. Surrogacy Laws by State, supra note 41. 
43. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/7
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IV.  Conclusion 
 
Undoubtedly, the outcome of legal disputes involving the 
enforceability of traditional surrogacy agreements depends on 
which state’s court has jurisdiction over the matter.  If New 
York has jurisdiction, women who find themselves in Sherri 
Shepherd’s position as the financial “breadwinner” spouse 
could successfully argue that they have no child support or 
other parental obligations pertaining to the resulting child of a 
surrogacy agreement deemed unenforceable by Domestic 
Relations Law § 122.  The surrogate who carried and delivered 
the child could likewise assert that she has no obligations to 
the child resulting from the unenforceable surrogacy 
agreement.  Sherri Shepherd’s ex-husband and the egg donor, 
as the biological parents, would likely retain parental rights 
and bear the child support obligations for the resulting child. 
On the other hand, if California has jurisdiction, the 
determination of parental rights is more complicated. A litigant 
who finds herself in Sherri Shepherd’s position could assert 
that their gestational surrogacy agreement differs from the one 
involved in the Johnson v. Calvert case in that the intended 
mother has no connection to the child by genetics or child birth.  
As such, it could be argued that the court should look to the egg 
donor (as the genetic mother) and the surrogate (as the child 
bearer) when determining parental rights and obligations to 
the resulting child.  Conversely, a litigant who finds themself 
in Sherri Shepherd’s ex-husband’s position could rely on the 
Buzzanca holding to assert that the surrogacy agreement is 
enforceable and, accordingly, he and his ex-wife (as the 
intended parents) should be deemed the legal parents of the 
resulting child since they were personally responsible for 
setting the medical procedures in motion to create their child, 
irrespective of the fact that the intended mother has no genetic 
connection to the child. 
The potentially differing outcomes reveal a need for 
further legislation in light of advances in reproductive 
technology and in the interest of consistency.  “Although 
uniform approaches to surrogacy agreements have been 
11
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suggested, none [of them] have been generally accepted.” 44 
 
A.  Post Script 
 
Subsequent to the submission of this article for 
publication, a Pennsylvania court obtained jurisdiction over the 
Sherri Shepherd litigation.  Following a hearing, the court held 
that Sherri Shepherd, as the intended mother under the 
surrogacy agreement, is the legal mother of the resulting child.  
The ruling has implications on child support and parental 
obligations which have yet to be resolved.45  Notwithstanding, 
this article’s comparative analysis on New York and California 
laws governing surrogacy and their applicability to similarly-
situated persons remains relevant. 
 
 
44. LORD, supra note 35, at n.29. 
45. See Emily Strohm & Diane Herbst, Inside Sherri Shepherd’s 
Surrogacy Ruling: What Happens Next, PEOPLE (Apr. 22, 2015, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.people.com/article/sherri-shepherd-legal-mother-surrogate-baby-
lamar-sally. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/7
